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Summary  findings
Keefer investigates the political determinants of  less informed, where elections are less competitive, and
government decisions that benefit special interest  where there are fewer veto players, because in these
groups-especially  government decisions to deal with  settings checks and balances are missing. These policies
banking crises. He finds that the better informed the  include:
voters, the more proximate elections, and the larger the  * Disseminating information about the costs of
number of political veto players (conditional on the costs  inefficient government decisions.
to voters of relevant policy decisions), the smaller the  * Improving the structure of legislative regulatory
government's  fiscal transfers are to the financial sector  oversight.
and the less likely the government is to exercise  * Intervening early in insolvent banks.
forbearance in dealing with insolvent financial  Keefer concludes that the more veto players there are,
institutions.  the less likely policies are to favor special interest groups
The results suggest that policies that might be  (contrary to previous views). Moreover, the closer the
appropriate for mitigating banking crises in the United  elections, the less likely policies are to favor special
States might be less effective in settings where voters are  interest groups.
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Very helpful comments from Omar  Azfar, Vladimir Dubrovskiy,  Armando  Castelar Pinheiro,
Clemente Forero, Michael Haupert,  Stephen Knack, Douglass North,  Michael Ross and David
Stasavage  have improved the paper significantly.It has been well-recognized  since  Olson's work of the 1960s  that the organizational
advantages  of narrow interest groups give  them special  influence  on government  policy, and
since  Bates'  work of the 1980s  that this influence  can have damaging  effects  on economic
development. More recent efforts have turned to the question  of why some governments  are
more receptive  to the concerns  of well-organized  narrow interest groups  than others. These
efforts have  not yet yielded  an abundance  of testable  predictions  about the conditions  under
which special  interests are more influential  in government decision  making. 1
Still, some  testable generalizations  have emerged. Baron (1994)  and Grossman  and
Helpman (1996)  show that incomplete  information on the part of voters encourages
government decision  makers to support special  interests at the expense  of voters generally.
These effects  have not been systematically  tested, however. Another body of research,  heavily
weighted  to the United States,  is grounded in the observation  that policy outcomes depend  on
the identity and preferences  of the veto players  in the policy making process. These  in turn
are determined  by such fine-grained  institutional details  as the committee  structure in
legislatures  and the rules governing  agenda-setting.  This literature traces the effects  on policy
of changes  in these "small"  institutions, holding constant the larger institutional framework  (a
bicameral,  presidential  system  with plurality elections  and two parties). However, to explain
large differences  in special  interest access  across  countries,  the larger institutional environment
is likely to be most relevant.
In this paper an attempt is made  to further understanding  about the determinants of
special  interest influence  in two ways. The first is to present a new argument about the role of
1  For example,  one  important  line  of research  analyzes  when  lobbyists  will  succeed  in shifting  policy
away  from  that preferred  by the median  voter. Besley  and Coate  (1999)  suggest  that electoral
competition  can  completely  offset  the effect  of lobbyists.  Felli  and  Merlo  (2000)  argue  that lobbyists
always  affect  either  policy  outcomes  or the identity  of the policy  maker.  They  also  show  that the  effect
of lobbyists  remains  even  when  electoral  rules  are  changed  in important  ways. In both papers,  the  key
parameter  is  the number  of citizens  of each  preference  'type",  limiting  testing  possibilities.2
institutions,  suggesting that as the number  of veto players increases, independent  of their
preferences, their incentives to offer favors to special interests diminishes.  While simple, the
model has testable implications that  are examined in the last half of the paper.
The second contribution  of the paper is to take advantage of cross-country  data on
banking crises to test empirically the political determinants of special interest influence.  The
empirical analysis tests the propositions  that incomplete information,  the prospect of elections
and the number  of veto players are significant determinants  of special interests influence over
government  oversight of the financial sector.  These tests offer some support  for both
informational  and institutional  explanations of special interest influence, and have significant
implications for the design of policy interventions  in the financial sector.
Information  and  special interests
Substantial theoretical research has found that if the electorate is uninformed  about
veto player action,: or characteristics, veto players are more likely to pursue the preferences of
narrow interests.  Key contributors  to this literature argue that when voters are less informed,
or more susceptible to campaign persuasion, candidates have a greater incentive to promise
policy concessions to special interests in exchange for campaign contributions  (Baron, 1994
and Grossrman and Helpman,  1996). There is, however, limited empirical work  exploring the
effect of voter information  on policy outcomes.
In Brunetti and Weder (1998) the presence of a free press is inversely associated with
corruption,  which can be viewed as an extreme form of special interest favoritism in which the
special interests are government  officials themselves.  Besley and Burgess (2000) have shown
that  Indian states in which there  is greater penetration  of print media in vernacular languages
exhibit faster responses to food calamities.2 Although  they are not concerned with the
2 In a revealing  case  study,  Johnson and Libecap (1999)  have also  extensively  documented  the efforts  to3
political dynamics of financial sector policy, Mehrez and Kaufmann (1999) do show that two
variables, one tracking  corruption  and the other based on responses by company  executives to
the question,  "does the government communicate its policy intentions clearly?", significantly
increase the probability  of banking crises, conditional  on financial liberalization.
The empirical tests below extends this line of research both  by using several indicators
of voter information  and, more importantly,  by taking into account the institutional
environment.  For example, the theoretical literature  assumes competitive elections in order to
generate its predictions,  an assumption examined in the analysis below.  In addition,  legal
changes meant to enhance citizen access to information  about government activities, such as
the U.S. Freedom of Information  Act, are often a direct response by one branch  of
government  (the legislature) to behavior by another  (the executive).  In the same way, just as it
is more difficult for governments with multiple veto players to override independent  agencies
such as central banks (see Keefer and Stasavage 2000), it is also likely to be more difficult for
them  to curb media outlets. That is, the level of citizen information  can also depend on the
structure of government  and, specifically, on the number  of veto players.  This variable is also
taken into account in the empirical work below.
Elections  and  special  interests
In the absence of elections, special interests are less restrained in their ability to make
deals with government  officials to secure their preferred policies at the expense of the median
voter.3 One would therefore predict that in comparing  countries with and without
which proponents of ethanol subsidies  have gone to obfuscate  the costs  and benefits  of the program.
3 This is implicit,  for example,  in Besley  and Coates (1999).  There are certainly  subtle issues  related  to
the paradox of voting and the relationship  between  special  interests  and voters.  However, as long as
the median  voter has  preferences  closer  to that of the median citizen than the prevailing  special  interests,
the conclusion  that elections  generally  rein in special  interests  is a reasonable  assertion.4
competitive  elections, those without  are more likely to exhibit policies that favor special
interests at the expense of voters at large.
A large literature  also suggests that the timing of elections should matter,  for at least
two  reasons.  The further  in the future are elections, the more heavily that elected officials
discount the benefits of re-election and the less of a constraint the election imposes on current
decisions.  In addition, Rogoff (1990) suggests that politicians use policy to signal their
competence".  If voters constantly  update their judgements about candidate competence, as
elections draw nearer politicians should be increasingly reluctant to approve policies that have
high social costs, since these would signal "incompetence."  Consistent  with these arguments,
Poterba (1994) finds that  both tax increases and spending cuts are much lower in gubernatorial
election years in US states.
The  number  of veto  players  and  special  interests
The policy consequences of the number  of veto players in a country  have been the
focus of a growing body  of research, which generally focuses on the credibility or stability of
government policies (see North  and Weingast (1994), Tsebelis (1999), Keefer and Stasavage
(2000)). The cornerstone  of this research is the argument that multiple veto players with
divergent preferences make policy change more difficult.  Credibility  problems  cannot fully
explain the drastic differences in policy outcomes that one observes across countries, however.
There are at least two additional reasons, independent  of the credibility effect, for which the
number  of veto players can also affect the extent to which  governments favor special interests.
The first reason is simple, if generally overlooked:  the absence of multiple veto players
in countries often means that some groups in society are less represented than  they otherwise
would be.  For example, it is possible that in a country  with only a president, that president
has encompassing interests and is responsive to the policy preferences of the "median citizen".5
Often, though, such a president is chiefly  concerned  with the welfare  of a narrow interest,
such as the branch of the armed forces  that ensures  that he remains in power. The
introduction of a new veto player in a country with such a president often signifies  that
citizens  who had been previously  disenfranchised  have gained  an institutional voice. That is, if
the number of veto players  tracks the extent to which all citizens  are represented,  government
officials  are more likely to grant special  interest favors  where there are few veto players.
This discussion  begs the question of whether an increase  in the number of veto players
reduces  incentives  to cater to special  interests  even when it leaves  unaffected  the social  groups
that are represented  in government decision  making. The model below examines  this case. It
establishes  that an increase  in the number of veto players  reduces  favors to special  interests
under the following  assumptions. First, veto players  value "status" or "prestige",  as well  as
payoffs  from special  interests, and "status" declines  as favors  to special  interests increase. 4
Second,  although status falls  with the number of veto players,  it falls  relatively  slowly: the
status that members  of the US House of Representatives  (with 435 members)  obtain from their
office  is at least 100/435  of the status obtained by members  of the US Senate (100  members).
Third, potential veto players  are of two types, one of which is more sensitive  than the other to
the negative  effects  on status of favors  to special  interests. Fourth, voters confront a fixed  cost
of expelling  incumbents. This cost might be the loss of the incumbents'  knowledge  and
control of the bureaucracy,  inside  knowledge  of ongoing negotiations  with foreign  partners, or
better understanding  of economic  policy generally. Alternatively,  the cost could  be seen as the
replacement  of incumbents  with new veto players  whose  preferences  on policy dimensions
4 The status  interpretation  of this assumption  is convenient,  but not necessary.  One can  as  easily
substitute  "disutility  of venality",  or the 'competence"  notion  of Rogoff,  as long  as  perceived
competence  declines  with favors  to special  interests.6
outside  the model are less  preferred by voters. 5 The fifth assumption  is that all veto players
are each elected  by the same constituency  - for example,  all voters in a single  electoral  district
that encompasses  the entire country.6 The literature focuses  extensively  on how different
electoral  rules lead candidates  to pursue different constituencies,  abstracting  from the effect  of
these rules on the number of veto players. This paper  takes the opposite  tack, abstracting
from constituency  effects  of institutional changes  while  focusing  on the number of veto
players.
Given these assumptions,  the analysis  that follows  reaches  two conclusions. First, as
the transfers from special  interests are spread over a larger  number of decision  makers,  the
attractiveness  of authorizing  large benefits  to special  interests  dwindles relative  to the loss of
status veto players  incur as a consequence. Favors to special  interests rise as the number of
veto players  fall. 7 The second conclusion  is less  obvious: the effect of the number of veto
players  is attenuated  the greater are the costs  that favors  to special  interests impose on voters.
The actors  and payoffs
There are 2n veto players and potential veto players  who are of two types, L and H,
depending  on whether the rewards they derive from the status of holding office  are more or
less sensitive  to special  interest concessions  (this characterization  is made more precise  below).
There are n veto gates  that political actors  compete  to control. Each incumbent veto player i, i
E{1. ....n} is opposed  by one challenger  veto player'j,  je {1... .n}.
5 This is similar to the assumption in Besley and Coates (1999)  that candidates confront  a fixed cost of
entry  into  a political  race.
6 For example,  prior to 1993, Peru had a presidential  system  where the president was elected  by the
entire country and the electoral  district for members  of the Senate  was also  the entire country.
7 Congleton (1984)  also  shows  that a committee  deciding  by majority rule will attract fewer  rent-seeking
expenditures than a single decision maker.  However,  majority  rule rather  than the number  of
committee  members is the key to his result.  For example, holding constant the voting rule, additional
committee  members could increase total  rent-seeking expenditures.7
Veto players make only one decision:  they decide to what extent  special interests
should benefit from government favors.  The special interest policies approved by veto players
are drawn from the policy space x, x E  [0, 1], where x is a normalized subset of the real line
assumed closed, bounded  and connected.8 For clarity, x = 0 is a policy of no favors to special
interests and the policy most preferred by special interests is x*E:  [0, 1]. The magnitude of
favors to special interests is given simply by q = d(x - 0), where d is a distance function  and q is
the extent to which policies authorized  by veto players diverge from x = 0, the outcome most
preferred by voters.
Special interests earn profits  z(q)  in each period that the favors are authorized.  The
profit  function is concave, with Jr>0O  and 7rq:O.  On the other hand, voters bear costs c(q)
from the favors authorized by veto players.  Costs increase at an increasing rate in the level of
favors authorized,  cq  > 0, C4q  >  0.9
Incumbent  veto players receive two kinds of payoffs.  First, in exchange for the favors
they authorize,  veto players receive Ri from special interests.  As, for example, in Besley and
Coate (1999),  the transfers R to politicians  directly enhance their utility and are not campaign
contributions  that  increase re-election chances.  The bargaining problem  between veto players
and special interests is assumed away in the model.  The share of rents that veto players receive
from special interests is assumed exogenous, so R = az(q), 0< a<  1.10
8 These are common  assumptions  in such a model,  where the stability  of decision  equilibria are not a
focus  of attention. See,  for example,  Segal,  Cameron and Cover (1992).
9 The assumptions  on costs  would hold even if favors  to special  interests  were simply  lump sum
transfers  from the population if the marginal  utility of income is diminishing  in income. We would
then expect  the utility losses  to the rest of the population to rise at an increasing  rate with the size of the
transfers.
10  This is a benign  simplification. The conclusion  of the model is that as the number of veto players
rises,  concessions  to special  interests  are less  likely. This conclusion  would be strengthened  if the
simplification  were not made,  since  bargaining  between  veto players  and special  interests  would likely
become  more difficult as the number of veto players  grew.8
Veto players also derive  utility from the stature and influence  they obtain from tenure
in office. However, stature is negatively  correlated  with favors  to special  interests. Incumbent
veto players  of type L receive  payoffs TL,i(q)  from holding office  and those of type H receive
payoffs  THj(q),  and T'(q) < 0.  Type L veto players are assumed  to be more sensitive  to the
status costs  of increasing  favors  to special  interests,  such that ITI  j (q)l  > )T'ji  (q)| . The
assumption  that some veto players  view their status or prestige  as being  more sensitive  to
payoffs  from special  interests  is certainly  plausible  if one compares  Corey Aquino relative  to
Joseph Estrada  in the Philippines or Chuan Leekpai  relative  to his newly elected  successor,
Thaksin Shinawatra,  in Thailand.
The bargaining  problem between  veto players  is also simplified. In particular, veto
players  are not permitted to hold out for the entire transfer of rents from the special  interest,
Ri = a(q). 11 Instead,  they operate under two rules. First, if veto players  are of the same  type,
they each receive  equal shares  in R, nRi = R.  If veto players  are of both types, those of type L,
whose  utility from holding office  is most sensitive  to payments from special  interests, can
demand side payments in exchange  for deviating  from their most preferred  position, but those
of type H cannot. In particular,  veto players  of type H must use a share of their rents to
compensate  veto players of type L for any level of favors above  that which veto players  of type
L would choose if they occupied  all veto gates. The logic  is the following: in the absence  of
any veto player action, no favors  to special  interests are authorized. It is reasonable  to assume
that the veto players  that prefer the smallest  favors  to special  interests are less  averse  to the no-
11  To the extent  that holdup  problems  are  not solved,  there  is no problem  of special  interests  - each
veto  players  demands  the full  value  of favors  granted,  and  special  interests  therefore  never  find  it
worthwhile  to purchase  favors  from  government  officials.9
favor outcome than are veto players of type H, giving  them extra leverage. The distributional
rule is a simple  way to operationalize  this leverage. 12
The order  of play
The model runs over an infinite number of periods. In the first period,  there are  g <
n incumbents of type L (those less  tolerant of favors  to special  interests)  and n -g incumbents
of type H.  Incumbents  calculate  two levels  of favors. One is the level of favors  that
maximizes  their utility in R and T  conditional  on ensuring their re-election. This is q".eleCt,
where the subscript  indicates  the choice of period 1 incumbents. Incumbents  also calculate  the
highest  level of favors  that maximizes  their utility when they do not intend to be re-elected,
conditional only on special  interests earning  positive  profits from the favors. This is  qxPel.
At the end of period 1, voters decide  whether to replace  incumbents with challengers.
Voters can replace  any combination of incumbents with any combination of challengers.
However, if voters decide  to change  the composition of the legislature,  they can never do
better than to replace  all incumbents  of type H, who are particularly willing  to support special
interests, and replace  them with challengers  of type L, who are particularly reluctant to do so,
yielding  a set of veto players in the second comprised  entirely of members of group L.  Veto
players  in the second  period then decide  on the level of favors  they will authorize  to special
interests.
When voters replace  veto players  from group H with those from group L, they incur a
fixed  cost e that reflects  the costs of expelling  incumbent veto players  from group H. If there
12  It is also  worth  noting  that since  every  veto  player  can  prevent  the favor  to the  special  interest  from
occurring,  special  interests  cannot  play  one  veto  player  off against  another. If they  could,  this  would
drive  payments  for favors  down  to negligible  levels  (as  in a model  developed  by Ramseyer  and
Rasmussen).10
are no incumbency  advantages, and voters have no way of credibly promising to re-elect
incumbents  who adopt qre.eleat  expel is always  chosen by incumbents.
Strategies
Although the model has an infinite number  of periods, voters never have an incentive
to change veto players after the second period.  There are two possibilities in the second
period.  One is that all incumbents  are re-elected, because they have selected  q'elC*  However,
if it is optimal for them to select q1 in the first  period, then  it is optimal  for them to
pursue the same strategy in every subsequent period,  since the composition of the opposition
does not change.
The second case is that first period incumbents  choose  q'xPel  and all incumbents  of
type H are replaced by challengers of type L.  Once a set of veto players comprised only of
members of type L is in power, however, voters will never replace them:  no other
combination  of incumbents  can promise a lower level of favors to special interests.
Given these two cases, the model can therefore  be solved backwards beginning in
period 2.  First, one calculates what new veto players would do in period 2 if they replaced
incumbent  veto players from period 1. This information  is then used to establish the strategies
that veto players pursue in the first period.  Five results emerge from the analysis.  The first
three  are that under  each of the three  strategies that veto players could pursue, concessions to
special interests decline in the number  of veto players.  The fourth  is that,  given certain
parameter  assumptions, veto players are not more likely to shift from low concession to high
concession strategies as the number of veto players increase.  Finally, the fifth result is that the
number of veto players reduces concessions to special interests by less, the larger are the costs
to voters of those concessions.11
From the introduction above, the second  period veto players  are different from the
first period's only if all the type Hveto players  have been replaced  by type L. Since  type L
veto players  will never be expelled,  the only constraint on their selection  of q is that
increments  to q have a positive  effect on the profits of special  interests. Each veto player in
period 2 (in the case  where challengers  from group L have replaced  incumbents from group H)
therefore solves  the following  maximization  problem:
max-(Ri(q)  + TL,i(q))
q  p (1)  q
s.t.
ir'(q) Ž 0
The maximand  is the stream of payoffs from the strategy  q over an infinite  number of periods,
discounted  by p.  Since  all veto players are identical,  they arrive at the same  answer, qL ,2*  The
existence  of a solution is guaranteed  by the concavity  assumptions  on Yr and T. For ITL  j (q)l
sufficiently  small,  the constraint binds (;n'(qL, 2) =  0) and these veto players  choose the level
of favors most preferred by special  interests. If, though, 1T1jj  (q)| is sufficiently  large such that
the rents from larger favors are offset more rapidly by losses  in status payoffs,  the constraint
does  not bind, and some lower level of favors  is selected. It is easily  shown that that qL,2  falls
as the number of veto players,  n, increases.
Result 1: If governments  are formed only of veto players  from group L, the group of veto
players  who are most harmed by favors to special  interests,  the larger the number of veto
players,  the lower are favors  to special  interests.
Proof:  See Appendix.12
The idea behind Result  1 is simply that as the number of veto players rises, the marginal
payoff to each veto player of additional favors falls, and with it the optimal level of favors
approved by the veto players.
Incumbents  in period 1 calculate the highest level of favors that they  can offer and still
be re-elected,  qfeele,  and the highest level of favors that they would offer if they did not
intend to be re-elected, qlXPCl,  knowing that if they  are replaced, their replacements  will
choose qL ,2.  They compare their stream of payoffs from choosing one or the other, and pick
the level of favors for which those payoffs are highest.
The incumbent  problem is complicated by the fact that incumbents  of type H must
compensate type L incumbents  for any level of favors higher than  qL, 2 , the favors chosen by
type L incumbents  if they controlled  all veto gates.  The total compensation is a function  of
the number, g, of type L veto players and of the difference in payoffs between their preferred
outcome  qL,2  and the outcome q to which they  are asked to agree, or:
(2) gkRi(qi  )+  TL,i  (qi )-  Ri (qL,,)  TL,i  (qL,2)]
To calculate qxPel,  therefore,  type H  veto players take into account their share of the
compensation to members of group L, (1/(n-g) of the amount  given by (2)) and undertake  the
maximization problem  (3). Since type H incumbents  are never re-elected if they  choose q'  PCI,
they maximize their returns  only over one period when  determining  qexpel,  conditional,  first,
on additional favors producing positive additional profits to special interests and, second, on
the value of the q they  choose being greater than that preferred by incumbents  of type L (if
this second constraint  is binding, the problem  collapses to (1)).13
maxRi(q)  + TH,i(q)-  g  ki(q)+  TL,i(q)-  Ri(qL, 2 )-  TL,i(qL,2)]
(3)  q
s.t.
zr'(q) Ž 0 and q 2 qL ,2
The existence of q"xPel  is again guaranteed by concavity conditions  on gr  and T.
Result 2 documents that  qlexp"e,  like qL ,2,  also falls as the number  of veto players increases.
Result  2:  The  larger  the  number  of  veto  players,  the  lower  is qXeI  provided  n >  2g.
Otherwise,  qexpel rises in the number  of veto players.
Proof:  See Appendix.
Finally, Period  1 veto players calculate qe-elect.  As before, they take into account
compensation to type L incumbents  and a profit constraint.  In addition, they condition their
choice on a re-election constraint.  This constraint  is based on the following calculation of
voters.  If voters expel incumbents  of type H at the end of period  1, they will pay the costs
associated with  qL,2  from the second period onwards.  In addition, they will bear the costs of
replacing  incumbents,  e.  Veto  players  therefore  choose  q1e-elect  such  that  the  costs to  voters  of
this policy are not greater than  the costs voters would bear if they  replaced incumbents  of type
H.  Incumbents  find  q"eelect by solving:
max  p{i  (q) + TH,i  (q)  _ g  i  (q)  +TL  ,i  (q)  -R i  (qL ,2 )TL ,i  (qL  ,2  )1
p  ~~n-g
(4)  q
ff'(q)  2  0, q  qL  ,2, and  c(q)  <  c(qL 2 )  + C
p(l±+p)  p(l+  p)14
As is clear by inspection, this problem is like the one in (3) with the introduction  of the
addition of the re-election constraint.  The interesting case in (4) is therefore  where the re-
election constraint  is binding and the others are not.  In this case, qre-elect  solves:
(5)  c(qie-ele ) =  c(qLz)
p(  + p)  p(l±+p)
re-elect  expel It is straightforward  to see that voters preferql  to q1 . The costs to voters from
the second period onwards of qe-elea  c(qLare) + e,  which are the same costs that they
would bear if incumbents  in the first period chose qXPel  . However, since the election
re-electexl constraint  is binding in (4) and not present in (3), q1 must be less than  q1 P  , so losses in
the first period are less.
re-elect As with the other strategy choices, q1 falls in the number  of veto players.
Result 3: The larger  the number of veto players,  the lower is q e-elec  for q,e-elec  s  q,xPel  and
n > 2g.  For n < 2g, the reverse is true.
Proof:  See Appendix.
Results (1) - (3) make clear that  as the number  of veto players rises, the level of favors
authorized to special interests under every strategy falls.  Two additional questions are of
concern, however.  The first is whether the presence of more veto players makes incumbent
veto players more or less likely to pursue  qexpel  rather than q'e "  . With  respect to this issue,
the question is how the relative payoffs to the three strategies change with the number  of veto
players. Having calculated q"xPel  and q1&elec,  incumbents  in period 1 compare their payoffs
under  each.  They choose  qre-ele"  if the following condition  is met:15
(6)  (  {  kR(q"")  +TL,j  (q"le)]+  gk(qL,2)  + TL,i (qL,2)]|
n-2gki(qexPel)  + TL  i(qexPel)]+g[Ri(qL, 2 )+  TL,i(qL, 2 )]
n-gng
In the case  where g = 0 (incumbent  veto players  in the first period are comprised only of those
who are more tolerant of favors to special  interests),  it is possible  to make unambiguous
statements  about the effect  of changing  n on the relative  magnitudes  of the left and right hand
side of condition (6).
Result 4: Provided the discount rate is sufficiently  small  and for g=0, an increase  in the
number of veto players  n leads  incumbents to choose a lower equilibrium  level of rents.
Proof:  See  Appendix.
Result  4 demonstrates  that it is unlikely that an increase  in the number of veto players  will
lead incumbents  to choose a higher rent strategy (q'xPel  instead of q  ele't) that would offset
Results 1, 2 and 3.
The second question  that remains  to be answered  is whether the effect of the number
of veto players  on the level of favors q depends  on the costs  to voters, c(q). Result 5 shows  that
as the costs  to voters of an incremental  favor increases,  the magnitude  of the low-favor
outcome,  q,ee  ect increases. In addition, the magnitude  of the negative  relationship  between
qlf  elctand the number of veto players n identified  in Result 3 declines.
Result 5: An increase  in the costs imposed  on voters by favors leads  to an increase  in the size
of equilibrium  favors  and an attenuation of the negative  relationship  between q"eelect  and n.
Proof:  See  Appendix.16
Result 5 says  that when voters face  high costs even if they expel  incumbents, incumbents are
freer to pursue a higher cost policy without risk of expulsion. An increase  in the number of
veto players  therefore has a smaller  effect when the costs of special  interest policies  are larger.
Implications of the model
The conclusion  from Results 1 - 4 - that more numerous veto players can reduce
policy distortions  that favor special  interests - is opposite  in its implications from the large
literature looking at the effects  of electoral rules on policy outcomes (synthesized  effectively  in
Cox and McCubbins, forthcoming). Many of the electoral  rules analyzed  in this literature
narrow the interests of politicians  while simultaneously  increasing  the number of veto players.
For example,  electoral  rules that encourage  candidates  to form their own, personal
constituencies,  such as open list proportional representation  systems,  or that encourage
multiple parties  to form rather than to coalesce,  such as those that do not place a floor on the
minimum votes a party must receive  to be eligible  for parliamentary  seats,  also give  greater
leverage  to narrow interests at the expense  of more encompassing  interests. Based  on these
constituency  effects,  the literature predicts a net increase  in pork barrel style policies. 13
However, most of these  institutions also  tend to increase  the number of veto players  in
a political  system: rules that encourage  candidate-specific  constituencies  give  US congressmen
greater veto power vis-a-vis  party leaders;  rules that encourage  fragmentation  encourage
coalition  governments  with multiple veto players. Based  on the analysis  here, this effect  rmight
offset  the constituency  effect. Provided these countervailing  effects  are strong enough, one
might therefore summarize  the institutional influences  on policy distortions as in Figure 1.
13 The  number  of electoral  districts  in a country  is another  electoral  rule  that influences  outcomes.  The
pork barrel  literature  (e.g.,  Schwartz)  predicts  that  the larger  the number  of decision  makers  with
distinct  geographic  constituencies,  the greater  their incentive  to agree  to collective  legislation  that
provides  public  works  projects  to every  district,  even  when  the net benefits  of these  projects  to society
as  a whole  is  negative.17
Figure 1: Summarizing  institutional  effects on policy  making
Many veto players  Few veto
players
Less susceptible  to  Fewer policy
special  interests  distortions
More susceptible  to  More policy
special  interests  distortions  to
favor special
interests.
Testing  the theory:  Special interests  and  policy distortions  in the financial  sector
More than 40 countries have experienced  banking crises  in the last fifteen years -
situations  in which a large fraction of banks are insolvent,  such that the value of their assets
Ooans)  is less  than the value of their liabilities,  including  deposits but also loans from the
central  bank and all other creditors. In several  cases,  crisis  has triggered  losses  exceeding  50
percent of national income. Considerable  evidence  suggests  that regulatory failures  benefiting
special  interests  exacerbated  the magnitude  of crisis. The remainder  of this paper explores  the
hypotheses  that these regulatory failures  were larger  in countries  in which information was less
complete,  where there were fewer veto players,  and where elections  were more distant.
Special interests  and banking crises
Although the analysis  of financial  sector  regulation  is the subject  of a large and
complex  literature, it is straightforward  to summarize  the ways  in which government policy
can contribute to crisis. A banking crisis  occurs when a significant  fraction of financial
institutions is insolvent  - when their assets loans, primarily)  are worth less  than their
liabilities  (deposits,  central bank credits  and credits  extended  from other sources). Of course,
numerous factors  unrelated to government policies  can cause  bank assets  to lose value (for
example,  a recession  or terms of trade shock that renders many borrowers  unable to repay18
their loans). However, prudent management  of banks - maintaining sufficient  capital  reserves,
diversifying  portfolios, etc. - mitigates  the effects  of such shocks  and can permit banks to
remain solvent  in hard times. Conversely,  even  minor economic setbacks  for a country can
trigger large  bank crises  if banks have been managed  imprudently - when banks engage  in
large amounts  of high risk/high return lending,  hold concentrated portfolios,  and lend to
insiders,  for example.
Government policies  play a significant  role in determining whether banks choose
prudent or imprudent strategies. First, governments  can implicitly  or explicitly  agree  to bail
out failed  banks. Deposit insurance  is one way in which governments  can do this, but far
from the only one. 14 If bankers and their creditors  expect to be indemnified  against  losses,
creditors  demand a lower risk premium than they otherwise  would when bankers acquire  high
risk, high return assets. Although this need not be the case,  governments  often establish  such
guarantees  for reasons  unrelated to the public interest - for example,  government officials  may
own banks or have financial  interests  in bank creditors. 15
This is the first possible  channel connecting  special  interest influence  to bank crisis.
The larger  the indemnification  that bankers or their creditors receive,  the greater  the quantity
of high risk assets  Ooans)  that bankers could acquire  and the larger  the magnitude  of the crisis
that such behavior could  trigger. 16
14 For example,  government  officials  in East  Asia  encouraged  or allowed  the massive  sale  of foreign
reserves  in an attempt  to sustain  currency  values  in the face  of devaluation  pressures.  These  officials  or
their  supporters  had financial  interests  in local  banks  that benefited  significantly  from  this action.
Those  banks  had  taken  on large  foreign-currency  denominated  liabilities.  These  could  not be repaid  out
of the  proceeds  of domestic  lending  if a significant  devaluation  occurred.  In the face  of pressures  on
their  currencies,  and  in a fruitless  attempt  to avoid  bank insolvencies,  government  officials  sold  off  most
foreign  exchange  reserves.
15  Government  officials  might  also  institute  guarantees  such  as  formal  deposit  insurance  because  they
fear  the  development  of bank  runs  - depositor  flight  from  all  banks,  including  sound  banks,  when  only
one bank  fails.
16  Even  without  government  indemnities,  information  problems  in financial  markets  can  give  bankers19
Even if financial  market participants anticipate  that bank liabilities  are indemnified,
governments  can still limit banks' acquisition  of high risk assets  through prudential regulation.
For example,  governments  can establish  a regulatory apparatus  that establishes  minimum
capital  requirements  for banks, supervises  appropriate  diversification  of bank lending
portfolios  by sector,  borrower, maturity, and currency, and that limits insider  lending by
banks. 17 Special  interests  that stand to gain from high risk/high return lending  would oppose
such regulation. Governments  that are more susceptible  to special  interests would therefore
adopt weak prudential regulation,  the second channel  through which special  interest influence
is associated  with larger banking crises.
Finally, even countries with the strongest  regulatory apparatus experience  bank
failures. Government policy at this juncture once again  influences  the magnitude  of crisis.
One option for governments  is to exercise  forbearance,  allowing  banks to lend their way out
of trouble or to wait for an upswing  in the business  cycle  to improve asset  quality.
Alternatively,  they can immediately  intervene  in insolvent institutions, replacing  management,
merging  banks, or shutting banks down. 18
Delayed intervention,  if not accompanied by intensified oversight of their operations,
allows banks to build up bad assets at an accelerating rate as they  'gamble for resurrection."19
Forbearance,  therefore, can benefit the same  special  interests  that preferred  loose prudential
leeway  to speculate  in high risk assets. Dewatripont and Tirole (1994)  emphasize  that because  banks
largely  finance  their investment  activities  by borrowing from unsophisticated  small  depositors  who face
a considerable  collective  action problem in monitoring  bank lending  decisions,  banks can shift  risk to
depositors  and incur higher risks than they otherwise  would.
17 Hellman,  Murdock and Stiglitz  (2000)  show, for example,  that for sufficiently  competitive  banking
markets,  banks  always  end up raising  deposit  rates of interest such that the only optimal strategy  is to
adopt the imprudent investment  strategy.
18 Theoretically,  lenience  is recommended  when managers  have  acted prudently but have  been caught
up in unpredictable  exogenous  shocks  Dewatripont  and Tirole, p. 183). The practical  problem  with
this is that regulators  have imperfect  information about the extent to which management  actions  have
contributed  to bank liquidity problems.20
regulations in the first place, and like those loose regulations, exacerbate the magnitude of
crisis.
One other key government  decision at the time that bank insolvencies occur is
whether to compensate all, some or none of the depositors and other  creditors in insolvent
institutions,  whether to pursue the assets of delinquent bank borrowers,  and whether to
recapitalize the insolvent banks.  The resulting fiscal transfers to the financial sector are likely
to be positively correlated with government  sensitivity to special interests.  First, the transfers
are bounded  from above by the difference in value between bank assets and liabilities.  That is,
where the influence of special interests has been less profound and the magnitude of banking
losses is small, so also are fiscal transfers.  Second, fiscal transfers to recapitalize banks or repay
depositors are larger to the extent that  governments make only feeble efforts to recover assets
from delinquent bank borrowers  - who  are often special interests that  benefited from earlier
lax prudential regulation.  Third, fiscal transfers are larger to the extent that governments
compensate not only small depositors,  but also large depositors and creditors of banks - again,
those who tend to be special interests in their own right and who are most likely to have
benefited from earlier lax government  oversight of the financial sector.20
The foregoing discussion identifies numerous  government  decisions that might
contribute  to banking crises and over which special interests might  exercise influence.  The
empirical tests below focus on two of them:  the magnitude of fiscal transfers in the event of
19  Akerlof and Romer, 1994,  introduced  the term and discuss  the phenomenon.
20 It might be argued  that special  interests  have no influence  on fiscal  transfers,  because  transfers  are
driven only by the (exogenous)  magnitude  of the banking crisis. The scanty evidence  that exists  on
crisis  magnitudes  suggests  that this is not the case. In Chile, the assets  of insolvent  institutions
amounted to approximately  22 percent of GDP, but bailout  costs  were twice as high, 41 percent. In
Colombia, assets  amounted to 8 percent of GDP, but the fiscal  costs of resolving  the crisis  were lower, 5
percent.  Deposits in insolvent institutions  were approximately 5 percent  of GDP  in Uruguay,  where
bailout costs were 7 percent of GDP; they  were 9 percent  of GDP in Malaysia in 1985,  where the
bailout amounted to only 4.7 percent  of GDP  (asset and deposit information  from Caprio  and
Klingebiel, 1997 and Beck, Demirgiiu-Kunt and Levine).21
crisis, and whether  governments exercise forbearance when confronted  with insolvent
financial institutions.  If these decisions were made by the same government  officials, then we
would expect the informational  and institutional  variables to affect them equally, and the
following hypotheses could be proposed  based on the earlier discussion:
1.  Veto players.  If the costs to voters of crisis is not too high, an increase in the number
of political veto players should, (a), reduce fiscal transfers in the event of a bank crisis,
and, (b), reduce the probability that  governments exercise forbearance towards
insolvent banks.
2.  Information.  When the fraction of uninformed  voters rises, (a), fiscal transfers should
increase, and, (b), the probability  of observing forbearance should rise.
3.  Elections.  The closer are elections, (a), the lower will be fiscal transfers in the event of
crisis, and (b), the less likely that governments  will exercise forbearance.
There are two important  caveats to these hypotheses, however.  It is likely that
decisions about fiscal transfers and regulatory forbearance are made by different subsets of
government  officials.  In particular, in countries that exhibit multiple veto players it is likely
that all of those veto players will participate in a decision to make large fiscal transfers to the
financial sector than that they will all approve a decision to forbear or intervene in an
insolvent financial institution.  This latter decision is more typically made within the executive
branch, without  the consent (or even knowledge) of the other veto players.  Consequently,
one would expect the influence of the number  of veto players to be a more pronounced
determinant  of fiscal transfers than  of forbearance.  Conversely, fiscal transfers, unlike
decisions to forbear, are difficult to hide from even the least informed voters.  The decision to
make fiscal transfers, therefore, should be less sensitive to the extent to which voters are
informed than the decision to forbear.22
Prior empirical  research  on the political  economy of government  responses  to
banking  crises
The work  by Mehrez and Kaufmann (1999) cited earlier, though not rooted in an
analysis of political dynamics, is the only attempt to examine informational  determinants  of
banking crises.  There are a number  of other studies that take institutions  into account in the
analysis of banking crises.  Romer  and Weingast (1991) consider the committee structure  of
Congress and the distribution  of narrow interests across congressional jurisdictions in
identifying the determinants  of legislative decisions to increase funding to the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation.  They do not directly test hypotheses  about the impact of
institutional  change on policy outcomes.21
Kroszner and Strahan  (1996) argue that regulators who lack resources are more
reluctant to intervene  in insolvent financial institutions:  if they  appeal to legislators for
additional funding, they  open themselves to the possibility that politicians will hold them
responsible for crisis.  Kroszner and Strahan (1996) document that  US savings and loan
regulators  shifted intervention  strategies as their resources dwindled, consistent with the
political hypothesis.  They  do not examine changes in institutional  and informational  variables
as determinants  of agency actions.
Rosenbluth  (1989) focuses on financial regulation in Japan.  She identifies a shift away
from one specific electoral institution  - single non-transferable voting - as contributing  to a
more aggressive regulatory posture towards insolvent Japanese financial institutions.  In a
book-length investigation  of financial crisis in the Philippines, Hutchcroft  (1998) amply
documents the interaction  of narrow interests (cronies) with political veto players (Marcos).
21 They do note that potential  future losses  from congressional  inaction were highly uncertain. One
effect  of this was that congressmen  could not see any way to claim credit from constituents  for efforts  to
prevent these losses - but were certain that they would trigger constituent  displeasure by transferring
resources from other priorities  to the recapitalization of the FSLIC.23
His focus does  not extend, however, the institutional and informational conditions  that made
such interactions  possible.
Data
The three hypotheses outlined earlier require information on the benefits  to special
interests of regulatory decisions  of government  in the financial  sector, the potential costs  to
society  of those benefits,  the completeness  of voter information on the actions of political
actors,  and the political institutions in which political actors are making these decisions. The
assembly  of such a set of variables  is a challenging  proposition, but a number of reasonable
variables  are available  in each of these categories.  These indicators,  the institutional and
informational  variables,  and other control variables  used in the analysis  are described  here.
Financial sector
Three financial  sector  variables  are crucial  to the analysis. Fiscal  transfers and
forbearance,  the dependent variables  identified  earlier,  are taken from Honohan and Klingebiel
(1999). The third variable  captures  the costs of crisis  to voters, found in Result 5 to play a key
role in the analysis.
Honohan and Klingebiel  (1999)  have assembled  data on government responses  to
financial  crisis for 40 crises in 35 countries. 22 In particular, they have calculated  the
magnitude  of fiscal  transfers governments  made in response  to crisis  and they have tracked
whether governments  exercised  forbearance  in their oversight  of insolvent banks. Their
calculations  of fiscal  transfers include both the fiscal  and quasi-fiscal  outlays for financial
system  restructuring, including  the recapitalization  cost for banks and the costs of
indemnifying  depositors. Transfers range  from 0.5 to 55.1 percent of GDP.
22 They relied  on Caprio  and Klingebiel  (1997 and 1999) and Lindgren,  Garcia and Saal  (1996), resolving
conflicts  by consulting  with country experts.24
For all forty crisis  episodes,  Honohan and Klingebiel  used interviews  with country
experts,  IMF reports and other sources,  to determine  whether, for each crisis,  government
officials  reacted  to the emergence  of insolvent  banks with forbearance.  Here the focus  is on
type III forbearance,  the most lenient, in which the variable  equals  one when governments
relaxed  regulations  or did not enforce  regulations  for at least  a twelve month period after being
informed about solvency  problems in the financial  sector, and zero otherwise. Twenty-four
countries (26 crisis  episodes)  exercised  this level of forbearance.
Result 5 indicates  that the effect of the number of veto players on fiscal  transfers and
forbearance  varies  with the costs to voters of favors  to special  interests. In the case  of the
financial  sector,  favors  to special  interests  create  deadweight  losses  by encouraging  the
extension  of credit to less creditworthy borrowers,  by encouraging  high risk projects at the
expense  of low risk projects, and by creating  incorrect  price signals  that induce an inefficient
transfer of human and physical  capital  from some sectors  to others. All of these costs  are
likely to be proportionate to the size of the financial  sector. That is, the more that economic
actors rely on financial  intermediation in the conduct of business,  the larger should be the
costs associated  with failures  in financial  sector oversight. The size of the financial  sector is
therefore used as a proxy for the costs to voters of favors  to special  interests  in the financial
sector.
In particular, a commonly used measure  of the size of the financial  sector,  M2/GDP, is
employed  in the regressions  below, for the year prior to the first year of the crisis. The simple
correlation between  M2/GDP and the fiscal  costs  of crisis is negligible  (-0.018),  confirming  that
there is no necessary  relationship  between  the level of favors granted  to special  interests  in the
financial  sector, as measured  by fiscal  costs of crisis, and the costs to the electorate  of additional
favors.25
Information
In the literature  on voting  behavior  in the United  States,  the extent  to which  voters  are
informed is assessed directly through  surveys of their political knowledge (see, e.g., Bartels
1996). Such information  is, unsurprisingly,  unavailable for cross-country research.  Three
proxies for voter information  that are available, however, ranging from voter education to
government  control of media, should capture the same underlying phenomenon  tracked in US
political research.23
Following Brunetti and Weder (1998)  and others, the regressions first employ two
variables collected by Charles Humana  (1985, 1992), one evaluating the independence from
government control  of radio and television networks, and the other the independence of
newspapers.  Since they  exhibit significant differences (they are correlated  at 0.69), both are
used.  The 1985 value of each variable is applied to crises of the 1980s and the  1992 value to
crises of the  1990s. The highest (most independent) score goes to countries in which there is
"unqualified respect" for the independence of the respective media.  Occasional breaches of
independence earn a country  the next highest score, followed by countries in which  there are
frequent intrusions on independence and finally countries that exhibit a constant pattern  of
violations of independence.2 4
23 Measures  of levels  of voter information range from interviewer  assessments  of respondents'  level of
information,  to respondent answers  to factual  questions. These turn out to be highly  correlated. One
would  expect  that voters exposed  to slanted  or limited media  would be less  informed according  to these
criteria,  and that less  educated  voters would exhibit  less  political  knowledge  than more educated  voters.
24 Notes in many of the country entries provide  greater  insight  into the criteria used. Government
ownership  and control of all radio and television  networks (as  in Ghana in the early 1980s)  earns
countries the lowest score; countries score the next to lowest score if they exhibit some limited private
ownership  or, as with newspapers  in Chile in the 1980s,  evidence  of seizures  of private newspapers  and
mandatory prior  approval of articles.  Argentina in the early 1980s, under the military government,  was
considered  to have  fully independent  newspapers,  but because  of evidence  of self-censorship  and
financial pressures by government on electronic media, was only given the second-highest score for
radio and television independence.26
The third information  variable that is used is a dummny  variable capturing whether
countries reported data on the prices of exports and imports  in the International Financial
Statistics. 25 Countries  that are lax or reluctant  about reporting such price data are more likely
to be the same countries in which voters are less well-informed.  In fact, in countries that do
not report these data, newspaper independence is rated  2.9 on average, relative to 3.4 for
countries that do report.
Institutional  variables
The Database of Political Institutions  (DPI), version 2 (Beck, et al., 2000) provides
useful measures of the political institutions  that the foregoing discussion has identified as
important.  All of the political variables used below are three year averages, starting with the
first year of crisis (reported by Honohan  and Klingebiel), and extending back to two years
prior to crisis (or the average of values in years t, t-1, t-2, t= first year of crisis).
The number  of veto players is captured by the variable Checks2a  from that  data set
(hereinafter, checks). This variable is built up from several other variables collected in the data
set.  Two of these ar,  .he legislative and executive indices of electoral competitiveness  (EIEC
and LIEC in DPI), scaled one to seven, that  indicate the competitiveness of elections.  EIEC is
also used to establish the validity of the underlying  assumptions in the information  literature,
that the effect of imperfectly  informed voters depends on the existence of competitive
elections.26
25 Educational  attainment was also  tried, but was insignificant  in all specifications.
26 Where there are no elections,  countries receive  a one; the scores  rise to seven  when there are multiple
candidates  and multiple  parties, and no single  party or candidate  receives  more than 75 percent of the
vote. If the legislative  index of electoral  competitiveness  is less  than five (where  five  indicates  that
multiple  parties can legally  be established,  but where only one party wins any seats in the legislature),
checks  is one. This reflects  the notion that legislatures  that are not competitively  elected  are less  likely to
exercise  decision  making authority independent  of the executive. Otherwise, coding  of this variable
depends  on whether countries are presidential  or parliamentary.
In presidential  systems,  checks  is the sum of one (if  EIEC is greater  than four), one (for the president),27
The checks  variable,  intended to reflect  the number of independent  veto players  in a
country, simultaneously  captures  some of the other institutional influences  that have  been the
subject  of scrutiny. For example,  a closed  list has the effect  of reducing  the number of veto
players  (by increasing  control of party leaders  over party members  in the legislature);  at the
same  time, the literature predicts that the introduction of a closed  list should reduce incentives
of individual  candidates  to appeal  to special  interests. Similarly,  the effect  of low voting
thresholds  in proportional representation systems  is predicted  to be the emergence  of more
smaller  parties appealing  to narrower constituencies. This should lead to governing  coalitions
with more parties, and therefore more veto players. The checks  measure  therefore allows  the
net effect  of these countervailing  institutional influences  to be assessed.
The proximity of elections  is the final institutional characteristic  of countries
exarmined  below. A variable  tracking the number of years to the next election,  legislative  or
presidential,  counting from the first year of the crisis,  has been created  from information in the
DPI.
A key challenge  in the analysis  of special  interest influence  is often that special
interests  line up on both sides  of policy debates. When this occurs, analysis  of the institutional
determinants  of special  interest influence  must take into account the constituencies  and
supporters of different government  veto players. In the case  of banking crises,  though, the
need to do this is dirninished  by the fact that special  interests  tend to line up on the same  side
of regulatory  issues. Government policies  that permit imprudent banking tend to benefit
narrow interests - recipients  of sweetheart  loans, bank owners and managers  - at the expense
one  for each  legislative  chamber,  and one if the first  government  party  is closer  in political  orientation
(eft, right  or center)  to the  first opposition  party  than  to the party  of the president.  If the  legislature  is
closed  list  (voters  must  vote  for  parties  and  cannot  register  candidate  preferences)  and  the president's
party has  a majority in parliament,  the legislature  is not counted as a check. In parliamentary  systems,
checks  is the sum of one (for  the prime minister)  and the number of parties in the governing  coalition;
the number  of  parties  is  reduced  by one if there  is a closed  list  and  the prime  minister's  party is  in the28
of large  and/or unorganized  interests, including  taxpayers  and the competitors of recipients  of
sweetheart  loans. 27
Other controls
Two economic  controls are employed. One is per capita income. GDP per capita
may mitigate  the size  of bank crises  to the extent that richer countries  tend to have  more
diversified  economies,  facilitating  bank efforts to maintain more prudent lending portfolios.
Richer countries  may be able  to support a more intensive regulatory effort, and may be better
able to establish  particular political institutions or to inform the public about government
decisions.
It is also arguably appropriate  to control for exogenous  economic shocks  that might
precipitate  crisis. This is arguable  because  government policies  affect  the incentives  of financial
sector  decision  makers to take precautions against  such shocks. For example,  to the extent
that bank portfolios are overexposed  to exporters,  a negative  terms of trade shock would
expose  banks to losses. However, terms of trade volatility is systematically  greater in countnes
that have more concentrated  export or import patterns. Terms of trade volatility is therefore a
predictable  part of the economic environment  in many countries, and therefore a condition
against  which prudent bankers would take precautions (Caprio and Klingebiel,  1997). The
introduction  of terms of trade volatility into the tests below therefore  potentially  obscures
policy errors due to special interest influence (ax oversight  of bank precautions  against
coalition.
27 Romer  and Weingast  present a good example  of how narrow interests  can line up on the same  side of
the regulatory  debates  preceding  banking crises. Healthy savings  and loans opposed  increasing  resources
to the regulatory  agencies  because  they feared  those resources  would come at their expense;  insolvent
savings  and loans opposed  increased  funding because  they knew this would trigger the end of
forbearance. These  two narrow interests  were not opposed  by other narrow and well-organized
interests,  and so prevailed  for several  years.29
predictable  shocks). Nevertheless,  despite  conceptual  problems and data coverage  issues,  the
effect  of terms of trade shocks are examined  in the empirical  work below. 28
Specification  and  Results
Two sets of tests are conducted,  the first explaining  fiscal  transfers as a function of
institutional and informational variables,  the second  explaining  government decisions  to
exercise  forbearance. Because  of the limited  number of observations,  a series  of regressions  is
presented  here, building  from the most parsimonious,  for which the whole sample  can be
utilized,  to more comprehensive  specifications  that exclude  observations.
The "base"  model is given  in Table 1, regression  1, where the fiscal  costs of crisis  are
explained  as a function of checks and balances,  the costs of favoring  special  interests (M2/GDP
), and the number of years from the first year of crisis  to the next election. The theory predicts
that at higher levels  of M2/GDP,  a larger  number of veto players  should have a more limited
effect  on favors  to special  interests. To test this, all regressions  include an interaction term,
cbecks*  M2/GDP. Information variables  are excluded. Regression  2 takes GDP/capita into
account and regression  3 incorporates terms of trade shocks.
Results  in Table 1 reflect  the predictions  regarding  the number of veto players. The
negative  coefficient  on the linear checks  and balances  term indicates  that a larger  number of
veto players  reduces  favors for special  interests  when the costs  of those favors  are low.
However, as favors become  more costly to voters, the effect  of the number of veto players  is
attenuated, as  the positive and highly significant  coefficient  on the interaction term checks*
M2/GDP  indicates. An increase  in the number of veto players  from the sample  minimum of
28 The change  in terms of trade is calculated as the ln[price of exports(t)/price  of imports(t)]  - ln[price
of exports(t-1)/price  of imports(t-l)],  where t is the first year of crisis. However, because  all of the
component prices  were available  for only 24 observations,  the variable  is supplemented  with the
percentage  change  in the prices of imports or exports alone,  to create a second  measure  with 31
observations  (the remaining  10 observations  had not even this much data).30
one  to  the  sample  maximum  of seven  reduces  the  fiscal costs  of bank  crisis  as a fraction  of
GDP  by approximately  31 percentage  points  when  M2/GDP  is at its lowest  value  (0.17), but
increases  the  fiscal costs  of bank  crisis  by 57 percentage  points  at the  highest  (1.87).29
Table  1:  Checks  and balances  and the  magnitude  of banking  crises
(Whijusted  s  tandard  errors  in parentheses)
Dependent  (1)  (2)  (3)
variable:  fiscal  Base  Controlling  for  Controlling  for
costs of crises  specification  income/capita  terms  of trade
constant  29.3  29.1  18.3
(9.8)  (9.9)  (10.4)
cbecks  -7.6  -8.0  -4.6
(3.3)  (3.8)  (3.0)
checks *M2/GDP  10.7  11.1  7.0
(4.3)  (5.0)  (3.7)
M2 /GDP  -28.3  -24.6  -16.2
(12.8)  (14.1)  (11.7
No.  ofyearsfrom  1.6  1.5  2.7





Terms of trade  -18.7
shock  (13.1)
R2  0.21  0.22  0.34
N  40  39  31
Note: Regression 2 excludes Taiwan because income per capita not available for Taiwan from
International Financial Statistics, IMF.  Observations  are 'clustered",  such that  independence is assumed
across countries but not between observations from the same country  (Argentina, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Turkey,  and Thailand). The standard error  of checks  and M2/GDP is evaluated assuming the interaction
term is zero.
29 The coefficients on the linear and non-linear terms actually suggest that for sufficiently high costs of
favors to voters  (M/GDPt,  an increase in the number  of veto players has a positive effect on the size of
fiscal transfers.  This is not predicted  by the theory,  but is easily explained.  It is plausible that  the
profits earned by special interests from  financial sector favors, and the size of the financial sector, are
both related to the number of veto players.  For example, expropriation  of financial assets is more
difficult when the number of veto player is larger.  Given this, it is easy to show that  the net effect of an
increase in checks and balances can be to increase the magnitude of banking  crises.31
The earlier discussion  predicts  that the "Number of years from first year of crisis to
year of next election" should be positively  related  to the size  of fiscal  transfers: the further in
the future that citizens can use the vote to punish political actors  who cater excessively  to
special  interests,  the larger are the benefits  to special  interests. The variable  has the predicted
positive  sign in all of the regressions  of Table 1, but is significant  only in Regression  3.30
However, the sample  includes  countries  where elections,  even when they are held, are
not necessarily  competitive  and therefore pose less of a threat to incumbent politicians. When
regressions  1 and 2 are run only on the 21 countries for which the variable  Executive  Index of
Electoral  Competitiveness  (EIEC)  from the Database  on Political  Institutions is at its highest
value  (seven),  the coefficients  on the proximity of elections  variable  rise substantially  and are
more significant. 31 For example,  in regression  1, the coefficient  rises  from 1.6 to 2.7 (p =0.10).
The /  -coefficient  of 0.29 in the sub-sample  indicates  that a 1.3  year increase  in the time to the
next election  is associated  with a 2.6 percentage  point increase  in fiscal  transfers.
The two control variables  are not significant  and have  little effect on the other
coefficients. Income per capita is highly insignificant  in regression  2: the wealth of countries
apparently  has no effect  on the fiscal  costs of banking crises  as a fraction of national income.
Moreover, although the number of veto players  (checks)  and the size of the financial  sector  are
positively  correlated  with income per capita (at approximately  0.23  in this sample),  all of the
terms from regression  1 retain the predicted  signs  and approximately  the same  statistical  and
economic  significance  in regression  2.32
30  It is  not the specification  in Regression  3, which  controls  for terms  of trade  shocks,  but rather  the
particular  sub-sample,  that is responsible  for this  result,  since  the  election  coefficient  is even  more
significant  when  the  terms  of trade  is omitted  in that regression.
31  The  maximum  score  means  that multiple  parties  and candidates  compete  for executive  office  and no
single  candidate  receives  more  than 75  percent  of the vote.
32  Using  the  log of per capita  income  yields  the same  result.32
Regression 3 controls for terms of trade shocks.  The dollar-denominated  indices of
export and import  prices are missing for many countries in International Financial Statistics.
This not only reduces the sample size by about 25 percent, but does so by removing countries
with lower than  average values of checks  and higher than  average fiscal costs of crisis. 33
Unsurprisingly,  given the selection bias introduced  by the variable, the coefficient values on
checks  and the interaction  term decline in this regression.  Among those countries that report
terms of trade data, the regression indicates, as predicted, that adverse terms of trade shocks are
positively, though  not significantly, related to fiscal transfers.
Table 2: Incomplete  information  and the magnitude  of banking crises
(White-adjusted standard errors in parentheses)
Dependent  (1)  (2)  (3)
variable:  Fiscal  Radio and TV  Newspaper  Availability of
costs  of crses  station  independence  trade statistics
independence  (export or
import prices)
Information  1.8  -0.08  -7.6
(see column  (2.2)  (2.8)  (4.7)
heading)
No. of yearsfrom  1.6  1.5  1.3
first year of crisis  to  (1.6)  (1.6)  (1.?)
year of next
election
R  2  0.11  0.09  0.17
N  36  36  39
Note: Regressions  also include a constant, lagged  M/GDP,  and GDP/capita,  not reported. The
significance  and signs  of the latter two variables  are comparable  to Table 1, however. Income per capita
is not available  for Taiwan from International  Financial  Statistics,  IMF. Regression  2 therefore excludes
Taiwan.  Observations  are "dustered", such that independence  is assumed  across  countries but not
between  observations  from the same  country (Argentina,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Turkey, and Thailand).
The role of incomplete  information  in the determination  of fiscal transfers in the event
of bank crisis is addressed in Table 2.  The estimates reported use the specification from
regression 2 in Table  1. The hypothesis is that where voters are incompletely informed, fiscal
33 Countries that do not report these data exhibit average  checks  equal  to 2.  1, and average  fiscal  costs  of33
transfers  should be larger,  though as the previous discussion  indicated,  the effect  should be
weak to the extent that fiscal  transfers are easily  observed  even by uninformed voters. In fact,
none of the information variables  in Table 2 are significant,  whether media independence  or
the availability  of trade statistics  (the  dichotomous variable  that takes a zero if information is
unavailable  in the IFS  to compute the terms of trade variable,  and a one if it can). Only the
trade statistic  variable  is of the predicted  sign,  albeit insignificant.
This lack of significance  of the information variables  persists  under numerous
alternative  specifications.  If checks  and checks  * M2/GDP  are included into each of the four
regressions,  these new variables  retain their significance  levels  as in Table 1, but the
information variables  remain highly insignificant. Nor does the omission  of GDP/capita
increase  their significance.  Predictions about the importance of voter information are
premised  on political systems  in which there are competitive  elections. Although the
information  coefficients  increase  in the sub-sample  that exhibits greatest  electoral
competitiveness  (EIEC  equals  seven),  as predicted,  they remain insignificant.
An evaluation  of the determinants  of forbearance  constitutes a more appropriate  test
of the influence  of information but, as the earlier discussion  indicated,  a less  appropriate  test of
the influence  of the number of veto players. Table 3 presents evidence  on the impact of veto
players  and incomplete information  on this more subtle aspect  of the government response  to
crisis: did government officials  exercise  forbearance  in the oversight  of insolvent banks? The
dependent  variable  is the (1,0)  policy decision  to forbear or not.  The regressions  in the table
utilize a probit methodology.
Regressions  1 and 2 of Table 3 demonstrate  that the number of veto players
contributes  in the predicted  way to the probability that governments  undertake actions  that
favor special  interests, but the results are less striking  than in the case  of fiscal  transfers. A
crisis  equal  to 16.1,  compared  to 2.8 and 11.6  in the countries that do report  these  data.34
larger number reduces  the probability of forbearance,  but this effect weakens  when the social
cost of forbearance  (given  by M2/GDJI rises.  The effects  are of the right sign in regression  1
and significant  in regression  2, when a control for income per capita  is added.
Table 3: Checks and balances,  information and the decision  to forbear
(Probit estimation;  coefficient  estimates  are marginal  effects  at mean values  of independent
variables;  p-scores  in parentheses;  standard errors are White-adjusted)
Dependent  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
variable:  Checks  Checks  Radio and TV  Availability  of
Forbearance  independence  trade statistics
checks  -0.16  -0.25
(0.12)  (0.0/
checks  F M2/GDP  0.21  0.44
(0.14)  (0.09)
M2/GDP  -0.62  -0.53  0.57  -0.15
(0.15)  (0.34)  (0.10)  (0.4/)
No. of yearsfrom  0.18  0.15  0.17  0.16
first year of crisis  to  (0.003)  (0.01)  (0.005)  (0.01)
year  of next
election
GDP/capita  -0.0  17
(0.16)
Radio and TV  -0.14
independence  (0.05)
Availability of  -0.30
trade statistics  (0.03)
pseudo_R 2 0.20  0.28  0.24  0.26
N  40  39  36  40
Note:  Income  per capita not available  for Taiwan from International  Financial  Statistics,  IM:F.  The
standard error of checks  and M2/GDP  is evaluated  assuming  the interaction term is zero. Observations
are 'clustered", such that independence  is assumed  across  countries but not between observations  from
the same  country (Argentina,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Turkey, and Thailand).
Both the proximity  of elections and the information  variables, however, have a more
statistically significant effect on forbearance than  on fiscal transfers.  In every regression in
Table 3, the proximity  of elections is highly significant, with p-scores never greater than  0.01.
For every year that this variable drops (indicating that the next election is one year closer),35
holding  constant either other institutional variables  - checks  - or informational variables,  the
probability  of forbearance  drops by approximately  16 percent.
Regression  3 demonstrates  that greater  independence  of radio and TV stations (like  the
independence  of newspapers,  not reported)  has a negative  and significant  impact on the
probability  that governments  forbear  from taking action against  insolvent  financial
institutions. The availability  of trade statistics  (in regression  4) also has a significant  effect on
the decision  to forbear. The greater  explanatory  power of information variables  is consistent
with the notion that fiscal  transfers,  but not forbearance,  are easily  observed  by even generally
uninformed  voters.
Again, the role of information could be conditioned  on the presence  of competitive
elections. This assumption  can be examined  for Table 3 regressions  by once  again splitting the
samples  according  to levels  of electoral  competitiveness. Coefficient  sizes  and significance  are
much higher in the sub-sample  of countries where elections  are most competitive,  consistent
with the theory that the effect  of incomplete  voter information operates  through an electoral
channel. The marginal  effect  of radio and TV independence  (evaluated  at the mean of all
variables)  rises  from - 3 percent in the 15  countries that exhibit lower levels  of electoral
competitiveness  to - 41 percent in the 21 countries that exhibit the greatest  electoral
competitiveness.  The change  in the coefficient  on newspaper  independence  is correspondingly
large,  from -5 percent to -64 percent. The coefficient  on the trade statistics  variable  rises  from
-15 percent in the sub-sample  that includes  only less competitive  countries  to -30 percent in
the whole sample,  including both less and more competitive  countries. 34
The regressions  in Table 3 do not control for institutional variables. However, media
independence  and the publication of trade statistics  are themselves  outcomes  of government
34  In the most  competitive  sub-sample,  the trade  statistics  variable  perfectly  predicts  forbearance  and36
policy making and therefore  should not be immune from institutional  and social variables.  In
fact, in the sample of countries used in this paper, the number  of veto players is a significant,
positive determinant  of the independence of radio and television stations.3 5 This raises the
issue of whether greater information  has an effect on government policy making independent
of institutions  and information.
Table 4 takes regression 3 in Table 3, focusing on radio and TV independence, and
adds the checks  variables and a control  for income per capita.  In regression 1 of Table 4,
political variables retain the predicted signs, but only the time to the next election are
significant at conventional  levels.  Again, though, theory  suggests that  information  variables
should have their greatest influence in countries where elections are most competitive.
Countries  that exhibit competitive  elections (EIEC=  7) are split nearly evenly between those
which forbore and those that did not.  Looking only at these countries, in regression 2, the
significance of all of the variables rises notably.  In the more competitive  electoral systems that
are assumed in models of voter information  and political behavior, the independence of the
media is a significant determinant  of the decision to forbear, even controlling for checks and
balances and the horizon  of decision makers.  These results hold for both the independence of
newspapers and the availability of statistical information.
drops out.
35 The coefficient  results  for checks,  social  polarization  due to ethnic fractionalization  and land area, all
statistically significant, are 0.18, -4.9 and 0.17.  Ethnic fractionalization  (taken from from Taylor and
Jodice 1983) is the probability  that two individuals randomly  selected from a country  do not belong to
the same ethnic or linguistic group.  To make it an appropriate measure of social polarization,  it is
transformed  so that high and low values of fractionalization equal low values of polarization.  Similar
results are obtained  using the fraction of the population  coming from the same ethnic or linguistic
group from Sullivan (1991). Area is from the  CIA World Factbook.37
Table  4:  The influence of checks and balances,  information  and electoral  competitiveness
on the decision  to forbear
(Probit estimation,  marginal  effects  at mean values  of independent  variables  are reported,  p-
scores  in paren  theses, standard  errors are White-adjusted)
Dependent variable:  (1)  (2)
Forbearance  Entire sample  Maximum  electoral
competitiveness
checks  -0.17  -0.29
(0.27)  (0.21)
checks  *M2/GDP  0.38  0.72
(0.17  (0.09)
M2/GDP  -0.17  0.26
(0.77)  (0.77
No. of yearsfromfirst  0.17  0.34
year of crisis  to year of  (0.008)  (0.01)
next election
GDP/capita  -0.016  -0.009
(0.27)  (0.67)
Radio and TV  -0.08  -.34
independence  (0.26)  (0.01)
pseUdo_R 2 0.30  0.55
N  36  21
Note: Income per capita not available  for Taiwan  from International  Financial  Statistics,  IMF. Sample
in Regression  2 is those countries  that receive  a six on the Executive  Index of Electoral  Competitiveness
(EIEC)  from the Database  on Political  Institutions.
Robustness
The results presented in Tables 1 - 4 are surprisingly robust, in view of the small
sample size, to numerous  different specifications and samples. Still, one might be concerned
about the role of omitted  variables, the quality of the variables proxying  for uninformed  voters
and the cost to voters of special interest policies, and about additional, plausible specifications
that are not examined above.  This section reviews these concerns.
One set of omitted variables is the numerous economic circumstances that  make
banking crises more likely, such as bouts of inflation and business cycle variables.  On the one
hand, though,  it is unlikely that these circumstances are spuriously correlated with the38
institutional  and informational  variables.  For example, it is difficult to argue that inflation or
business cycle variables are determinants  of both crisis decisions and of constitutional  variables
such as the number  of veto players.  Moreover, it is unlikely that such a correlation  would be
greater in a sub-sample of countries with more competitive  elections.
On the other hand, the results are robust, or improve,  after the inclusion of income
per capita.  This means that  any omitted  variables that determine  both the political variables
on the right hand side of the regressions and the government  decisions on the left hand side
must at the same time be unrelated to country  incomes.  Again, this seems unlikely.
A stronger case might be made that underlying social variables, such as the degree of
social polarization  due to ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity  in a country,  could influence
both the right hand and left hand side variables.  However, the inclusion of the social
polarization  variables described in footnote  32 leaves unchanged or strengthens the coefficient
values on checks,  checks  *M2GDP, and the number  of years until the next election in regression
1, Table  1 and in regression 1, Table  3. It also leaves unchanged or strengthens the
information  coefficients in regressions 3 and 4 of Table 3.
The information  variables used in the analysis are only approximate  measures of the
extent to which voters are imperfectly  informed about the connection between economic
conditions  and the actions of government  officials. The question, however,  is whether  the
defects of these variables contribute  noise to the analysis or actual bias. The results suggest the
former.  One might argue that the three  information  variables capture underlying political
characteristics unrelated to voter information.  Countries  that restrict media freedom are more
likely to be authoritarian,  for example, and therefore more likely to exhibit high fiscal
transfers or excessive forbearance in the event of a bank crisis for reasons independent  of voter
information.  If this were the case, though, the coefficient values of the information  variables39
in Table 3 would exhibit a decline, instead of the increase that is actually observed, when the
sample is restricted to countries with the most competitive  electoral environments.
Moreover, it is difficult to explain why,  if these variables were capturing some omitted
underlying  political or social phenomenon,  such a phenomenon  leads to spurious significant
results in the case of forbearance  (Table 3) but not fiscal transfers (Table 2).  An information-
based explanation, however (that fiscal transfers are more easily observed than  forbearance
even by voters denied access to independent  media) seems more satisfactory.
The results are somewhat robust to the use of measures other than lagged M2/GDP  to
capture the costs to voters of special interest favors in the financial sector.  Two measures
suggested by Beck, Demirgiiu-Kunt and Levine (forthcoming) are liquid liabilities of the
financial system and private credits extended by deposit banks and other financial institutions.
The checks  variables in Table  1 retain their significance when lagged values of either  of these is
substituted for lagged M2/GDP.  In particular,  the interaction  term is always significant in each
of the three regressions.  These variables are not robust to alternative measures of financial
sector development  in the forbearance regressions in Table 3.  This, however, is not surprising
given that multiple  veto players are not expected to participate in a regulatory decision such as
forbearance.
The information  variables in the last two regressions of Table 3 remain significant
when alternative measures of the size of the financial sector are used.  However,  only the
election variable in Table 4, but not the information  variables, retains its significance when
alternative financial sector measures are used.
It is possible in many circumstances that  an increase in the number  of veto players has
a greater effect at low levels (e.g., moving from one veto player to two) than  at high levels.
One key permutation  not examined earlier was therefore  the use of the logarithm  of checks. In
fact, the results in Tables 1 - 4 are robust to the use of the logarithm  of checks.40
Finally, the estimates  reported in the tables all take into account that observations  on
multiple  crises  in the same  country might not be independent. However, it might also be
argued  that observations  on simultaneous  crises  in different countries  might not be
independent. Re-estimating  the regressions  by clustering  observations  by year does not
change  the results, however.
Conclusions  and  policy implications
The analysis  in this paper simultaneously  takes into account, for the first time, three
determinants  of the influence  of special  interests  on government policy: the number of veto
players,  the proximity of elections,  and the extent to which voters are informed. The findings
have implications  both for the academic  debate on the role of special  interests and for the
policy debate regarding  financial  sector  regulation.
The analytical  and empirical  findings  suggest,  first that the number of veto players  can
reduce  favors  to special  interests. This conclusion  contrasts with theoretical  findings  in a large
literature in which electoral and political  institutions that produce a larger number of veto
players,  such as proportional representation  systems  with low vote thresholds, give  greater
incentives  to veto players  to favor special  interests. The model in this paper, looking only at
the number and abstracting  from the constituencies  of veto players,  concludes  the opposite.
The empirical  section  offers some support for the conclusion  that this countervailing  influence
is important.
Second,  the empirical  results indicate  that the closer  are elections,  the less likely are
policies  that favor special  interests. That is, although elections  may stimulate a demand for
resources  among  political actors,  which might be expected  to encourage  special  interests,  the
disciplining  effect  of elections  appears  to more than offset the exigencies  of campaign  finance.41
Third, the work suggests  that the effects  of information on policy outcomes  can be
identified  empirically  only by taking into account both the institutional and policy
environment. In particular, the fraction of uninformed  voters is likely to favor special
interests  least when institutional arrangements  deprive informed  voters of influence  (as  in
countries  lacking  elections),  and for policy outcomes  for which the public can easily  assess
official  responsibility.
The findings  in this paper also suggest  a different  set of financial  sector policy
recommendations  than those that have emerged  from the study of the United States  savings
and loan crisis. Based  largely on rigorous examination  of the US case,  for example,  Kroszner
(1997) argues  that five  measures  can potentially improve government financial  sector  policy
and reduce  the cost of crisis: disseminating  information  about the costs of inefficient
government  policy; ensuring competition among  interest groups;  increasing  the transparency
of government  decisions;  improving the structure of legislative  oversight  of the regulatory
process;  allowing  the entry of foreign  banks. Implicit in the empirical  work of both Kroszner
and Strahan  (1999)  and Romer and Weingast  is a sixth policy implication,  that regulatory
change  should be packaged  to appeal  to diverse  veto groups.
These recommendations  place great weight on the disciplining  role of information  and
take for granted an institutional environment characterized  by competitive  elections  and
multiple  veto players. The cross-country  evidence  marshaled  here suggests  that these should
not be taken for granted. Moreover,  the evidence  from this sample suggests  that these are also
pre-requisites  for information dissemination  and interest group competition to have a salutary
effect  on government  financial  sector  policies.42
Appendix  - Proofs  of Results
Result 1: If governments  are formed only of veto players  from group L, the larger  the
number of veto players,  the lower are favors  to special  interests.
Proof:  Recalling  that Rj= (ac/n)r(q), rewrite the first order condition from (1)  as
1  a r' + Ti') = 0, assuming  the constraint is non-binding. Totally differentiate  with respect
Lk2  la  (af
to n to get  =  2 )f (qL,2)(-?(qL  2) + Tl7qL  2))  . For a maximum  to exist,
-a'  + T' >  Oforq SqL2  and-a  ' +T' < Oforq 2  qL,2  ,and  therefore the concavity
n  2  n
condition  + Ti"<  0 is fulfilled  at qL,2.  Since  the first term is positive,  then,  L  < o.n
n  'ln
Result 2: The larger the number of veto players,  the lower is q expel,  provided n > 2g.
expel  ineth Otherwise, ql  risesn  the number of veto players.
Proof:  As with Result 1, recall  that Rj= (a&)X)(q)  and rewrite the first order condition from
(3) as
- 71' + TH -- (g-r  + Ti)  =0, assuming  the constraints are non-binding. Totally
n  H'i  n-g  n
differentiate  with respect  to n to get
&q xpel  (n-2g  a  in  a  expel  xpel)_  g  expel)
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For n > 2g,  the first term is positive and the second  term must be negative  for a solution to
exist.  Therefore,  ￿  < 0.  For n < 2g, it becomes  too expensive  for veto players who care43
less about the status costs  of special  interest payoffs  to compensate  those veto players  who care
more,  so Il  >O. o
(5n
Result 3: The larger the number of veto players,  the lower is q"1"ele  for qre-elect  qlexpel  and
n > 2g.  For n < 2g, the reverse  is true.
Proof: Totally differentiate  equation 5 with respect  to n to get
ee  [p  re-  )]e  p(t+p)  <q  Cxpel2  2)]since  c rises in q,  (5)
~ =~c~ e.let{L1  c(xe1)  L12  IL,2
and by Results 1 and 2, this expression  must be negative  when n > 2g and positive  otherwise.  o
Result  4: Provided the discount  rate is sufficiently  small and for g= 0, an increase  in the
number of veto players  n leads  incumbents to choose a lower equilibrium  level of rents.
Proof: Totally differentiate  (5)  with respect  to n, setting  g = 0.  Payoffs  to pursuing qXe'Pl  (the
right hand side of (5))  change  as follows:
S(Payoffsto  qf pel)  a,  .(qexpel)+  '~  F1  E,(qxxieI)+  T(qlx  P)l.  Howeve,  y
i5n  n2  n  Ln  I
conditions of maximization,  the sum in squared  brackets must equal zero. Payoffs  to adopting
q1e-elea,  the left-hand  side  of (5),  change  in a similar  fashion,  unsurprisingly:
re-eect  p  r{en2  eeee  )+  Z  elect  a  qre-elea)+
J(Payoffsto  qeleacreeett)  e-lc  re-q  elea~
6,2  Ln~~~2+  '  jj  +T'
Since  q  -expel  q2  ctlec the sum in squared brackets  is positive  and the entire second  term in
curly brackets  is therefore negative. For a sufficiently  low discount  rate,
c5(Payoffsto  5PXPel)  3(Payoffstoq,  )  si
(5n  37n44
a  74(q  expel  >rl  (q  re-  electl  the sufficiently low discount rate need not be particularly
low.  U
Result 5: An increase  in the costs  imposed  on voters by favors  leads  to an increase  in the size
of equilibrium  favors, and an attenuation in the negative  relationship  between qe-  ele" and n.
Proof: Assume  that costs can be rewritten as c(RJa),  where a is a parameter that is high or low
depending  on whether voters bear higher or lower costs  from increases  in favors  q. Rewrite
condition (5) as
1 C(/qe elec) = C(,&IXPel)  +  c(/Pgq 2)  + e.  Totally  differentiating  this  expression  with respect
to ,B  gives
(5qC  q re-eledcf(qre-elect  q expelcF(q expel  qL2C  (q  i
. I aepPelc?  q  1P)  +  q(i  2cPq),  i>  0.  That  is, when
voters bear higher costs from any given  level of favors,  they have less  leverage  over
incumbents,  and incumbents are freer to choose a higher level of favors  without fear  of
expulsion. Moreover, totally differentiating
iqr-elect  = 1i  e  lc  expel  1  exelI\L1
-C=  ±  e.ie(q  ct'1F'a)  c?(q  xPeI)+  (L,'  c (q  i  from Result 3 with 1  1  )  ~~p(1+  p)  c  L,
respect  to ,B, one observes  that the negative  relationship  between favors  and the level of
checks is also attenuated,  since
d1e  =-  1  r&elect(re-elect  1 Cp(qre-elect\l  x
:q  -- P  ql  cp  )+  1  <  t2  qt2) 
by  thxpel qc  xpelca  (q  expelto  n  c  L2  ql  02 L  Sn  I  +p( +  p)  S5n  L2 
by the concavity assumptions on c and Results 1 and 2..45
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